Executive Summary
This 
Fiscal policy should continue to support economic activity until economic recovery has taken hold (and, indeed, additional discretionary stimulus may be needed in 2010). However, the positive growth impact of fiscal expansion would be enhanced by the identification of clear strategies to ensure that fiscal solvency is preserved over the medium term. Without such strategies rising interest rates and risk premiums could erode the effectiveness of stimulus measures. Few countries have yet articulated the needed medium-term policies in adequate detail.
This Cross-Country Fiscal Monitor is the first of a series of regular updates on global fiscal developments and prospects, based on the approaches introduced in The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term Policies After the 2008 Crisis. The Monitor will also explore topical fiscal questions. Consistent with the Fund's cross-country surveillance mandate, it will examine developments in a variety of country groups, with somewhat more emphasis on G-20 countries in light of their importance for global developments. Two main issues of the Monitor are envisagedin April and October, shortly following the circulation of the IMF's World Economic Outlook (WEO). Shorter quarterly updates could be prepared in between, as circumstances warrant.
I. INTRODUCTION
This edition of the Cross-Country Fiscal Monitor draws on Fund staff projections for the July 2009 WEO Update and supplements analysis for the surveillance note for the Meeting of G-20 Deputies in Basel on June 27. 2 Section II provides an update of the fiscal impact and policy response to the crisis. Section III discusses policy challenges and exit strategies.
II. THE FISCAL POLICY RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS: AN UPDATE

Fiscal policy response in the G-20 countries
1.
The crisis is having a substantial impact on fiscal positions in the G-20 countries. Overall deficits are projected to increase by 5.5 percentage points of GDP in 2009 and 2010, both with respect to 2007 pre-crisis levels and excluding losses from financial sector support (Table 1) , broadly unchanged from estimates prepared three months ago. 3 In advanced G-20 economies, fiscal deficits in 2009-10 are now estimated to be somewhat larger, in some cases reflecting weaker growth prospects in 2009 before a stronger recovery in 2010. 4 By contrast, changes in fiscal balances are now expected to be smaller in other G-20 countries, particularly those where commodity revenues are important. 
2.
The pace of announcements of new crisis-related discretionary measures has slowed. Estimates of the impact of these stand at 2 percent of GDP in 2009 and 1.6 percent of GDP in 2010. Spending represents more than three-quarters of stimulus planned for 2009, but its share is expected to drop to around two-thirds in 2010, as some projects are completed 2 See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/update/02/index.htm and external/np/g20/070809.htm. 3 See Appendix Figure 1 , which shows how staff's assessment of growth and fiscal balances has evolved with the unfolding of the crisis. Projections through 2014 reflect a substantial narrowing of output gaps, and for most countries, assume fiscal adjustment, although this may not reflect specified policy measures in the outer years.
( Figure 1) . 5 Emerging G-20 countries have announced somewhat larger stimulus packages for 2009, on average, than advanced G-20 countries. This reflects smaller automatic stabilizers and consequently greater need, as well as substantial fiscal space in key emerging market countries. China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa have introduced large packages. Emerging market discretionary measures are also more heavily weighted to infrastructure investment and less focused on income tax cuts (Figure 2) . 
3.
The more sizable overall fiscal expansion in the advanced G-20 countries reflects larger automatic stabilizers. These reflect, in turn, larger governments (e.g., as measured by the revenue-to-GDP ratio) and a greater deterioration of output gaps (Table 2) . Other factors contributing to the fiscal expansion across the G-20 include the impact of nondiscretionary effects on revenues beyond the normal cycle (e.g., the revenue impact of the extraordinary decline in commodity and real estate prices and financial sector profits), as well as noncrisisrelated discretionary spending or revenue measures. 
Assessing the impact of fiscal expansion
4.
A comprehensive progress report on the implementation of stimulus measures is difficult, as specific information is so far limited. Only a few G-20 countries are providing detailed reports on stimulus execution, for example, through dedicated websites (Canada, France, and the United States). In the United States, stimulus spending is picking up, with US$64 billion paid out through mid July, 35 percent of the amount available. The amount of stimulus has roughly doubled each month since February (chart). The pace of social security spending has been relatively quick, while expenditures in energy and transportation have been slower (just 1 percent of planned infrastructure spending has taken place). 6 Together with over US$50 billion worth of tax breaks provided, 41 percent of the expected annual U.S. stimulus (US$283 billion) has been paid out, or 0.8 percent of GDP. In Canada, 81 percent of the planned stimulus for 2009 has been committed (available to spend). 7 In France, 60 percent of planned 2009 stimulus has been paid out-full payout of tax credits and 26 percent payout of expenditures. Specific reporting on stimulus implementation in other countries has not gone much beyond initial announcements. Tax cuts were enacted at the outset, and their impacts on the fiscal accounts are being felt broadly as expected, with reports of correspondingly lower revenues (particularly for targeted tax breaks). 8 From regular fiscal reports, transfers and capital spending have risen in comparison with past years in several G-20 countries (e.g., Argentina, Canada, China, Indonesia, Korea, Saudi Arabia), likely in connection with stimulus initiatives. In others, stimulus spending has been less visible. In all countries, the pace of spending is affected by procedures for budgetary allocations, transfers to subnational governments, procurement, and payment to contractors, even for "shovel ready" projects. 
5.
The growth impact of the overall fiscal expansion, once fully implemented, may be sizable. Given uncertainty on the size of fiscal multipliers, growth impacts are estimated using ranges of multipliers (Table 3 and Box 1). Estimates for growth impacts range from 1.2 to 4.7 percentage points in 2009 and from 0.1 to 1.0 percentage point in 2010, both with respect to the previous year. 10 These estimates consider the effect of spillovers to other countries (via imports), a key element of the crisis response and efforts to pursue coordinated global action. The estimates are broadly consistent with the findings of structural models, although they reflect the impact of the full fiscal expansion and not only the discretionary stimulus. The effectiveness of discretionary measures in stimulating activity was a key topic at an IMF Conference on Fiscal Policy held in June, which also considered the length of implementation lags and what can be done to reduce them, the functioning of automatic stabilizers and the tradeoffs in enhancing them, and the role of fiscal rules and independent councils in anchoring expectations of government solvency.
11
Box 1. Taking Stock of Fiscal Multipliers
Fiscal multipliers measure the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating output. 1 The size of multipliers depends on the type of policy-spending increases or tax cuts-and country circumstances. Multipliers are larger when monetary policy is accommodative. In the GIMF, fiscal multipliers are 2 to 3 times larger with accommodative monetary policy than without.
2
Fiscal policy action is also more effective when coordinated across countries. The GIMF finds multipliers of 3.7 for the United States under coordinated fiscal policy, compared to 2.4 without coordination. The channel is the "leakage" of the fiscal stimulus into demand for imports. Empirical work confirms that more open economies have lower fiscal multipliers than those less exposed to international trade.
Lack of policy credibility (real or perceived) lowers multipliers by increasing risk premia and raising real interest rates. The GIMF shows that, depending on the extent of fiscal sustainability problems, higher public spending or tax cuts can have a negative impact on output by inducing morethan-offsetting increases in private saving. ________________ 1/ Fiscal expansion and growth are calculated with respect to the previous year. Fiscal expansion is measured as the change in the real overall fiscal balance between the two years in relation to real GDP of the previous year. 2/ The range of growth estimates reflects different assumptions on fiscal multipliers. The low set included a multiplier of 0.3 on revenues, 0.5 on capital spending and 0.3 on other spending. The high set included a multiplier of 0.6 on revenues, 1.8 on capital spending and 1 for other spending. For calculation of the growth impact of total fiscal expansion a weighted average of current and capital expenditure multipliers was used. 3/ For the calculation of growth impacts, the change of the overall fiscal balance was adjusted: for Russia and Saudi Arabia, the change in non-oil revenues was used (rather than total revenues); for Saudi Arabia, the change in discretionary measures was used (rather than total expenditures); for the United States and Japan, estimates of losses from financial sector support were excluded.
Impact of the crisis on non G-20 countries
6.
The crisis has also affected fiscal balances of countries outside the G-20. Projected increases in overall fiscal deficits in smaller advanced countries of 7. 
7.
Much of the increase in fiscal deficits in emerging market and developing countries reflects a sharp decline in revenues (including due to lower commodity prices), not fully matched by lower spending. In a sample of 22 non-G-20 emerging market countries, output gaps are estimated to turn from a PPP GDP-weighted average of 2.5 percent of potential output in 2008 to -0.9 percent in 2009 and to -2.4 percent in 2010. 13 Some of these countries entered the crisis with relatively sound fundamentals and room to allow automatic stabilizers to operate or even to use discretionary stimulus. Most, however, have faced significant constraints. Several benefited from buoyant tax collections in recent years (and favorable access to financing) and sharply increased their spending ( Figure 4 ).
When conditions changed, revenue gains slowed, but spending growth continued. Expenditure levels are now proving difficult to sustain. Just a handful of countries from this group have announced stimulus plans for 2009. 14 Financing from the Fund and others is helping some of these countries ease the burden of adjustment in the near term. 14 These countries are Armenia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Peru, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
Measures to support financial and other sectors
8.
Governments and central banks have also continued to provide direct support to the financial and other sectors. 15 However, while support measures have been large, immediate impacts on government financing needs have been more limited. Guarantees do not require upfront government financing, and institutions providing other support measures are generally outside the government sector (central banks, state-owned financial institutions, and special corporations). Upfront government financing needs connected with financial support operations are estimated at 5.5 percent of GDP for the advanced G-20 countries and 0.4 percent of GDP for the emerging G-20 countries (Table 4 ). 
9.
Financial sector support provided by governments so far has generally been considerably less than originally announced. For example, for those advanced economies for which data are available, while the average amount allocated for capital injection was 3.4 percent of GDP, the amount utilized so far has been just over two-fifths of that (1.4 percent of GDP or US$425 billion) ( Table 5) . 17 The estimated utilization rate for the purchase of assets and treasury lending is even lower, at less than one-fifth of the allocated amount. This outcome appears to reflect a variety of factors including the precautionary nature of initial announcements, indications of increasing stability and improved bank liquidity, and lags in implementation of programs for recapitalization and purchase of assets. Central bank credit facilities appear also to have been taken up only to a limited extent in many countries, as conditions have turned out to be less dire than expected at the time of their announcement. 
Prospects for recovery of fiscal positions
10.
Fiscal balances are expected to strengthen gradually over the medium term but the deficits are likely to remain well above their 2007 levels. Although output gaps are projected to largely close, overall fiscal deficits remain higher in 2014, compared with 2007, by around 2½ percentage points of GDP for the advanced G-20 countries and 1½ percentage points for emerging markets (Table 6 and Figure 5 , first panel). For the advanced countries, the larger overall deficits are explained by higher interest payments (by 1.7 percentage points of GDP, on average) and higher primary expenditures. For the emerging markets, the deterioration is explained by primary spending increases, while revenue gains in some countries offset sustained lower commodity revenues (from exceptionally high 2007 levels) in others. These staff projections incorporate significant structural fiscal adjustment during 2011-14, beyond the withdrawal of stimulus (1.6 percent of GDP in 2010), both in advanced G-20 countries (by 2½ percentage points of GDP) and in emerging market G-20 countries (by about 1 percentage point). This fiscal adjustment, which needs to be supported by identification and implementation of specific revenue and expenditure measures in most countries, is expected to help offset spending pressures arising from aging and health care costs (the latter due to aging as well as reasons beyond demographics) through 2014. These pressures are expected to increase in the next five years and to accelerate sharply after 2015 (see Box 2) . The ultimate fiscal costs of the crisis could well be larger, however, if adjustment policies are not put in place or if downside risks materialize.
11.
Public debt is expected to continue to rise in advanced economies (Appendix Tables 1 and 5 expected to stabilize at around 85 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2014, about 23 percentage points above the pre-crisis level. However, this masks large differences between advanced and emerging market G-20 economies. In the former, debt levels are 
Box 2. Aging and Health Care Spending Pressures in Europe and the United States
Growth in age-related and health-care spending (the latter reflecting in part demographics) is likely to be relatively contained over the next five years, but will pick up sharply in the following decade. Based on the European Commission's (EC's) recent Ageing Report, under the assumption of no policy changes (e.g., reflecting only already enacted legislation), pension, health, and long-term care spending in the European Union is expected to grow by about 0.5 percent of GDP over the period up to 2015 (compared to 2007), with the increase accelerating after 2015. These expenditures are projected to rise by 1.9 percent of GDP over 2015-30 and by a further 2.9 percent of GDP between 2030 and 2060. This reflects the timing of the baby boom in Europe, which implies a marked increase in the cohorts reaching retirement age starting in 2020-30. In the short run, net age-related costs may be partially reduced by lower spending on education, as a result of declining fertility and the smaller size of childbearing-age cohorts up to 2030.
These projections are subject to a number of upward risks, in particular with regard to health care spending. A key risk relates to weaker productivity growth in the medium term due to population aging and the effects of the public debt build-up in response to the crisis. Spending pressures on healthcare and long-term care have been conservatively estimated by the EC as they are based on the assumption of unchanged relative prices, contrary to recent trends. Higher relative prices for health services and wider availability of high-tech treatments, as well as greater demand for health care services due in part to the rapidly expanding share of the elderly population, could also escalate health care spending. (In alternative scenarios, the EC estimates additional health care expenditures that could arise from nondemographic factors to range from 2½ to 4½ percent of GDP by 2060). Population aging also could be more rapid, if life expectancy gains are faster (due in part to better health care services). Unemployment may also remain high several years after the crisis, and labor force participation may not increase as expected, leading to lower output growth and higher spending ratios.
However, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the impact of structural factors on future spending trends. For example, technological progress could improve well-being at older ages and foster more active labor participation, ameliorating spending dynamics. Labor supply may also increase in response to lower pensions due to depletion of pension assets during the crisis.
Policy implementation challenges are an additional source of upward risk to these projections. In some countries, existing rules for social security benefits imply a sharp reduction in replacement rates over the medium term. While this may help contain upward pressures on pension expenditure trends, the changes may be politically difficult for governments to enact once benefit levels fall below certain thresholds. Moreover, the changes could trigger increases in other areas of government spending (e.g., social assistance benefits), since a larger number of elderly could qualify for these programs as a result of falling social security incomes.
The specific age-related components in Europe are projected to evolve as follows: expected to rise to close to 120 percent of GDP, up from about 80 percent of GDP before the crisis. This owes to persistent primary deficits, the higher interest bill, and weak economic growth. 18 In emerging market G-20 countries, debt levels are expected to decline slightly after the initial post-crisis peak (the first increase in debt since 2002 in these countries). This reflects positive primary balances after 2012 (although smaller than in pre-crisis years), lower interest spending than in advanced G-20 economies, and stronger projected economic growth. Once again, the ultimate costs of the crisis could well be larger, if downside risks materialize.
Market perception of risk
12.
There has been an upward trend in government bond yields in major advanced economies since early this year ( Figure 6 ). Although bond yields have eased somewhat in the last few weeks and the long end of the yield curve remains below pre-crisis levels (including in countries that have been hit most by the crisis), there had been a noteworthy upward shift in bond yields in most advanced economies. This has reflected primarily a move back to more normal levels of market appetite for risk, as signs emerged that the rate of decline in economic activity was moderating, and financial sector conditions were beginning to stabilize. Also, there appears to have been some pickup in inflationary expectations, reflected in the difference in yields on U.S. government bonds and inflation-indexed securities (TIPS yields). However, the earlier increase and the recent widening of the term premiums (measured by the 2 to 10-year yield spreads) may also reflect, to some extent, large issuances and the impact of moves by credit rating agencies. In summary, given the large and widening output gaps, higher bond yields reflect primarily moves toward normalization of conditions. They may also signal some concern by investors about the size of central bank balance sheets and possible public debt monetization. Going forward, these factors could begin to weigh more on market perceptions of sovereign risk.
13.
CDS spreads (the price of insurance against sovereign default) in advanced economies have also shown an uptick in the last few weeks. This follows an earlier marked decline from March onwards, which appeared to be associated with a reduction in systemic risk and an improvement in market sentiment, consistent with a historical analysis of the determinants of such spreads. The more recent uptick has taken place even though corporate CDS spreads generally continued declining. It may correspond in part to the recent moves by the ratings agencies and associated concerns about public debt. 
14.
The spread of emerging market bonds over U.S. debt also increased in the second quarter of 2009. The increase, by about 40 basis points, resulted in a return of the EMBI spread to pre-crisis levels of around 400 bp. Following a sharp reduction from the beginning of the second quarter, CDS spreads in emerging economies have also seen an uptick in recent weeks, reflecting in part some concerns about access to market financing as well as developments in advanced countries. 19 19 CDS spreads in emerging markets are highly correlated with those in advanced economies: the correlation is about 0.85.
III. POLICY CHALLENGES GOING FORWARD
15.
The sharp increase in government debt has complicated the management of preexisting challenges from population aging, especially in advanced economies. The increase in debt ratios projected for these economies is the largest since World War II. Moreover, governments have taken on large contingent liabilities-guarantees and other commitments to future expenditures-that may materialize. These developments have occurred against the backdrop of looming challenges from population aging: prospective costs from pensions and health care together could amount to more than ten times the costs of the crisis. 20 Fiscal adjustment will therefore be needed in the post-crisis environment, anchored by supporting institutional arrangements.
The scale of fiscal adjustment needed in the medium term
16.
The increase in deficits and debt raises complicated tradeoffs. Policymakers will need to balance two competing risks: on the one hand, a too hasty withdrawal of fiscal stimulus would risk nipping a recovery in the bud; on the other hand, with a delayed withdrawal investor concerns about sustainability may increase, leading to higher interest rates on government paper, undermining the recovery and increasing risks of a snowballing of debt. At this stage, with recovery not yet underway (and likely to occur at different times in different countries), fiscal adjustment is premature.
17.
Regardless of the timing of adjustment, its necessary scale will be quite large, particularly for high-debt advanced economies. Preserving investor confidence in government solvency is key to avoiding an increase in interest rates, thereby not only preventing snowballing debt dynamics, but also ensuring that the fiscal stimulus is effective. To halt or reverse the increase in debt-to-GDP ratios, sizable improvements in primary balances will be required in most advanced and several emerging market economies. To illustrate the scale of the task ahead, the necessary primary balance was computed for the following objectives, starting from the projected 2014 debt levels:  For (i) advanced economies whose debt-to-GDP ratios are projected below 60 percent in 2014 (6 countries), and (ii) emerging market countries whose debt-to-GDP ratios are projected below 40 percent (9 countries): stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio from 2014 onward; 21 20 For more discussion, see: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0913.pdf. 21 The debt/GDP ratio evolves according to the identity:
, where D is the debt stock, Y is GDP, r is the nominal interest rate, g is the nominal growth rate, pb is the primary fiscal balance as a share of GDP, and Δ indicates a change over the previous year. The debt ratio is constant when
pb= (D/Y)(r-g)/(1+g).

For countries above these thresholds: beginning in 2014, reduce debt-to-GDP ratios gradually over 15 years to 60 percent by 2029 for the advanced economies (halve the debt for Japan) (16 countries) and to 40 percent for the emerging market economies (10 countries).
Assuming a difference between the real interest and real growth rates of one percentage point from 2014 onward, attaining these objectives would require, on average (Table 7) :
 For the advanced economies, an improvement in the primary balance prevailing in 2014 by 5.4 percentage points for the higher-debt group; no improvement would be needed for the lower-debt group.
22
 For the emerging market countries, an improvement in the 2014 primary balance by 0.8 percentage points of GDP for the higher debt economies; no improvement would be needed for the lower-debt group. Despite the limited need for fiscal adjustment from this standpoint, some emerging market countries may nevertheless face refinancing challenges in the current global financial environment.
18.
The necessary effort for each country will depend on its own circumstances, notably its initial debt position. Estimates for individual countries reveal a wide variation in the need for adjustment (see Appendix Table 5 ).
19.
Although favorable developments in growth or interest rates would make the needed adjustment less challenging, the task ahead remains serious under most scenarios (Box 3). Rapid economic growth has often played an important role in reducing large debt-to-GDP ratios in the past-both through its direct impact on the denominator, and by facilitating adjustment in the primary balance through increased revenues (as long as procyclical spending increases were restrained). Nevertheless, barring a sharp, unexpected increase in inflation, which would reduce the real value of the debt but bring about an associated disruption of its own, fiscal adjustment is likely to be the most important channel through which fiscal sustainability will be ensured in the years ahead.
20.
The requisite fiscal adjustment is made more demanding by pressures in the areas of pensions and health care. Under current policies, spending on pensions and health care is projected to increase substantially over the next two decades in several countries, especially the advanced economies. Owing to these pressures, which existed prior to the global financial and economic crisis, attaining a given primary surplus presents challenges that were not experienced to the same extent in the past. 3/ Average primary balance needed to stabilize debt at end-2014 level if the respective debt-to-GDP ratio is less than 60 percent for advanced economies or 40 percent for emerging market economies (lower debt economies); or to bring debt ratio to 60 percent (halve for Japan and reduce to 40 percent for emerging market economies) in 2029 (higher debt economies). The analysis is illustrative and makes some simplifying assumptions: in particular, beyond 2014, an interest rate-growth rate differential of 1 percent is assumed, regardless of country-specific circumstances; moreover, the projections are "passive" scenarios based on constant policies. 4/ PPP GDP weighted for each respective group. Advanced higher debt economies: Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States. Advanced lower debt economies: Australia, Denmark, Finland, Korea, New Zealand, and Sweden. 5/ Advanced economies are labeled as "higher debt" if the debt/GDP ratio is projected at 60 percent or more in 2014; lower debt otherwise. 6/ PPP GDP weighted for each respective group. Emerging market higher debt economies: Argentina, Brazil, Hungary, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, and Turkey. Emerging market lower debt economies: Bulgaria, Chile, China, Indonesia, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Ukraine. 7/ Emerging market economies are labeled as "higher debt" if the debt/GDP ratio is projected at 40 percent or more in 2014; lower debt otherwise.
Fiscal adjustment strategy and supporting institutional features-a status update
21.
Successful fiscal adjustment to ensure that debt returns to sustainable positions will hinge on measures to contain aging-related spending, for countries with looming demographic pressures. Entitlement reforms in the areas of pensions and health care will play a key role in two respects. First, such reforms are necessary to improve the primary balance, thereby helping to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. Second, the extent to which the projected debt-to-GDP ratio is viewed as sustainable depends in part on the outlook for pensions and health care systems over the longer run. Thus, reforms that improve the longrun outlook would, other things equal, permit a somewhat less ambitious reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio over the coming years.
22.
Going forward, a strategy to ensure fiscal solvency should thus be based on: (i) a firm commitment and a clear strategy to contain aging-related spending, especially in
Box 3. Primary Balance Adjustment Needed and Interest-Growth Differential
Under the assumption of an interest-growth differential of one percentage point, the higher-debt advanced economies would need to attain a primary surplus of 4½ percent of GDP from 2014 onward to achieve the gradual debt-reduction objectives described earlier. (The relevant interest rate is the average cost of borrowing for the government-for most advanced economies, usually proxied by yields on medium-to long-term government bonds.) With a zero differential, the required surplus would amount to 3½ percent of GDP-still a serious challenge. With a differential amounting to two percentage points, a surplus as high as 5½ percent of GDP would be needed. The impact of the differential on the need for adjustment is greater (in percentage points of GDP) the higher the debt-to-GDP ratio, and is thus most pronounced for the advanced countries with relatively high debt (see chart below). An interest-growth differential in the range of 0-1 percentage points in 2014-29 would not be unusual by historical standards. A 2-percentage point differential would be more pessimistic, but still plausible, taking into account the higher debt levels and a possible decline in potential growth in the years ahead. Although projections for the interest-growth differential beyond 2014 are not available, current WEO assumptions for the largest advanced economies for 2014 envisage that the differential would be at-or slightly below-zero using short-term interest rates; longer-term rates have historically yielded about one percentage point in excess of short-term rates. The average (long-term) interest-growth differential in the main advanced countries rarely exceeded 2 percentage points in 15-year periods during the past one and a half centuries, whereas negative differentials were experienced during the oil price shocks of the 1970s (Catao and Mackenzie, 2006) . advanced economies; 23 (ii) growth-enhancing structural reforms; and (iii) fiscal policies cast within medium-term fiscal frameworks (and supportive institutional arrangements) that envisage a gradual fiscal correction once economic conditions improve. 24 The remainder of this section focuses on this last point, where some initial action has occurred.
Primary Balance Needed and Interest-Growth Differential
23.
Several institutional features are likely to play an important role in anchoring fiscal adjustment. These include a formal commitment to medium-term fiscal consolidation, with appropriate flexibility in the event of output shocks; and procedures for identifying and disclosing the public sector's overall fiscal position, including items that may not yet appear in "headline" deficits or debts, but represent contingent obligations.
24.
There is growing interest in medium-term fiscal frameworks and their potential role in recovering from high debt positions. 25 Medium-term fiscal targets can help provide a clear indication of what country authorities perceive as a desirable fiscal policy path. Such targets can help anchor market expectations if they are credibly set and buttressed by appropriate institutional frameworks (for example, medium-term expenditure frameworks that set multi-year limits at the aggregate, ministerial, or program level, in order to translate overall objectives into budget decisions). During the crisis, countries with existing fiscal rules have, for the most part, retained them-in some cases making use of escape clausesalthough the crisis has tested their resilience and highlighted the importance of built-in flexibility to avoid tightening during recessions.
25.
Few G-20 countries have so far developed fully fledged medium-term fiscal adjustment strategies, although some have announced medium-term targets or have extended the horizon of their fiscal projections. Recent developments include:

In June, the parliament in Germany adopted a new constitutional fiscal rule for both federal and state governments that envisages a gradual move to structural balance from 2011. The rule requires the federal government's structural deficit (the deficit adjusted for the effects of the cycle and one-off operations) not to exceed 0.35 percent of GDP from 2016. States are required to run structurally balanced budgets from 2020.
In Japan, the authorities aim to halve the primary deficit (excluding the social security fund) within five years and to achieve primary balance within ten years. The authorities have also committed to stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio by the middle of the next decade and placing it on a downward path during the early 2020s. 23 An early start to entitlement reform would not necessarily undermine the fiscal stimulus. For example, an increase in the retirement age would yield savings for the government without reducing aggregate demand. 24 To this end, the task will be easier if fiscal stimulus packages consist of reversible measures. 25 A forthcoming IMF study will address the pros and cons of fiscal rules in the post-crisis context.
The United Kingdom projects an annual average fiscal consolidation of 1⅓ percentage points of GDP from 2010 to 2014, so that debt begins to decline by 2015-16.
The U.S. authorities have published ten-year fiscal forecasts-a welcome step, though underlying projections for growth and interest rates appear optimistic. The authorities have also presented to Congress legislation that would reintroduce statutory pay-as-you-go provisions for new programs (requiring offsetting revenue increases or expenditure cuts for any new program introduced.)
26.
However, medium-term consolidation policies have yet to be articulated. Where they have been mooted, measures have focused on increases in taxation of fuel and on making income taxes more progressive, and in some cases on limiting growth of current spending or cutting capital expenditure. Table 8 provides an overview of preliminary strategies to ensure fiscal sustainability and measures across the G-20 countries. A revival of tax revenues and a reversal of discretionary spending initiatives may also be expected when conditions improve, although some of the revenue base (e.g., from elevated profits in the financial sector or real estate) may have been lost permanently. Also, gains from "unwinding" fiscal and financial support operations are uncertain, and in some countries significant political capital will need to be expended to ensure that stimulus measures do not become permanent. In any case, a recovery of cyclical revenues and not renewing the fiscal stimulus will reduce deficits, but will be insufficient to reverse the recent increases in public debt. Going forward, medium-term fiscal adjustment strategies-including entitlement reform-have greater potential to reassure market participants and the public at large.
27.
Preserving fiscal solvency requires accurate information on the public sector's overall position and appropriate management of assets (and associated liabilities) acquired as a result of recent measures in support of the financial system. 26 While the impact of such measures on deficits has thus far been limited, the impact on sovereign balance sheets has been far more pronounced, as a result of liquidity provision, lending operations, and recapitalization and asset purchase operations. 27 Although these measures have not directly affected the public sector's net worth, they have led to increases in government equity holdings. Moreover, central banks and other public sector entities have increased their claims on financial institutions. Government contingent liabilities have also risen, largely through extension of guarantees. These developments have heightened the importance of preparing a sovereign balance sheet, but also the challenges this would involve, owing to the increasingly blurred boundaries between the public and private sectors.
28.
A further element in assessing the state of the public finances relates to the risks they face-the importance of which has been illustrated by the recent crisis. 28 Over the past few years, several countries have begun issuing annual Statements of Fiscal Risks (from macroeconomic shocks, natural disasters, and contingent liabilities), thereby strengthening support for prudent fiscal policy, facilitating risk management, and reducing borrowing costs. Going forward, such statements-which are likely to deepen their treatment of fiscal risks from uncertain economic growth and government intervention operations in support of the financial system-may help inform the exit strategy from large public debts. Budget system and public administration reforms, enhanced tax compliance, and fiscal federalism. Japan
Halve the primary deficit (excl. the social security fund) within five years and achieve primary balance within ten. Stabilize debt ratio by the mid 2010s and place it on downward path during the early 2020s.
Nonrenewal of stimulus; higher consumption taxes and savings on health care and public administration spending.
Korea
Balanced budget (excluding social security fund) over the medium term. 
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